The Case for Kentucky Sex Offenders: Residency Restrictions and Their Constitutional Validity by Sterrett, Alicia A.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 96 | Issue 1 Article 5
2007
The Case for Kentucky Sex Offenders: Residency
Restrictions and Their Constitutional Validity
Alicia A. Sterrett
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sterrett, Alicia A. (2007) "The Case for Kentucky Sex Offenders: Residency Restrictions and Their Constitutional Validity," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 96 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol96/iss1/5
The Case for Kentucky Sex Offenders: Residency
Restrictions and Their Constitutional Validity
Alicia A. Sterrett'
INTRODUCTION
O VER the past ten years, our country has seen the widely publicized and
often gruesome stories of children and other members of our society
victimized by "sexual predators." This topic can hardly be escaped with
television programming aimed directly at exposing the unfortunate realities
and news programs that delight in broadcasting the controversy surrounding
these crimes. While the necessity of addressing these crimes is apparent,
there is another side to this story-one that is often neglected. It involves
the difficulty of those convicted under the very statutes aimed at protecting
society from "predators." These men and women are neighbors, friends,
and family members, and all of them have the misfortune of facing lifestyle
restrictions that could infringe upon their constitutional liberties. Despite
the fact that very few of these men and women are guilty of heinous crimes
worthy of a news spot, they live in the shadow of more infamous offenders.
This Note examines the plight of these offenders through the looking-
glass of federal and state legislation passed to thwart these "predators"
and the constitutional challenges many of them have raised with particular
emphasis on the challenges of Kentucky offenders.
A. History and Development of Community Restriction Laws
Throughout history, certain categories of criminals have always attracted
public scrutiny. The most recent group of offenders to come into the public
eye are sex offenders. While it may seem a relatively new issue given the
rush of legislation that has followed the gruesome and highly publicized
attacks on several children, sexual offenders are not new phenomena.
These crimes were sensationalized long before the modern media even
emerged! However, the way we have chosen to address the issues that
arise with these offenders is a new take on an old approach. The original
i B.A. 2oo5, Transylvania University, J.D. expected 2oo8, University of Kentucky College
of Law. The author wishes to thank her amazing family for their unconditional support, par-
ticularly her extremely patient husband, Chad. Without them, none of this would be pos-
sible.
2 See Rachel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the 'Sex Psychopath' Statute: From
the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 900 (1995).
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approach to dealing with these "sex psychopaths" was to treat them for
their illness, which, because their condition of release was based upon a
recommendation made exclusively by psychiatrists, often resulted in their
indefinite removal from society. These offenders could not re-enter society
until they were no longer a "threat" under this very subjective standard.3
The "treatment" was premised on the assumption that these persons had
a mental defect that was somehow curable.4 These civil commitment
statutes spread much like the modern day registration laws, with nearly
half of the states having one by the 1960s.5
The view that sex offenders could somehow benefit from treatment
changed during the 1980s when legislatures turned away from
rehabilitation. 6 The onslaught of highly publicized crimes during the
1990s caused legislatures to retreat from their earlier abandonment of
committing these offenders for treatment and turned toward combining
these civil commitment statutes with a criminal penalty.7 There was
a slight change in their approach as civil commitment became a way to
extend, sometimes indefinitely, an offenders' commitment after having
served a prison sentence as well.8 The most recent approach to dealing
with sexual offenders is reflected in the Community Notification laws that
have become more the rule than the exception.
B. The FederalActs
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act was passed by Congress in 1994.9 The Act
mandated that all states enact programs requiring those offenders convicted
of a criminal offense against a minor or a sexually violent offense to register
a current address with state or local authorities. 10 It also defined the length
of required registration as based upon previous number of convictions, the
nature of the offense, and the characterization of the offender as a sexual
predator." As if states needed more motivation than the public outcry
stemming from the media frenzy involving sexual offenders, the Office of
the Attorney General issued guidelines stating that those states failing to
comply within the requisite time period would be subject to a mandatory
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 903 (citing the states who had such statutes during this time).
6 Tom Prettyman, Note, Federaland State ConstitutionalLaw Challenges to State Sex Offender
Laws, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1076 (1998).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).
,o Id. at § 14o71(a)(i)(A).
in Id. at § 14o71(b)(6)(A).
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ten percent reduction in Federal Local Law Enforcement funding, with
those funds reallocated to the states that had complied."2
The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996, following the highly
publicized crime against the young Megan Kanka of New Jersey.
According to the media, Megan Kanka was a seven-year old girl who lived
with her family in a quiet suburban town. Unbeknownst to her family,
a convicted sex offender loomed just across the street from their home.
13
One fateful afternoon, he enticed Megan into his home, offering to show
her the puppy he assured her was inside. Her death occurred less than
thirty yards from the front door of her own home. 4 The amendment to the
Wetterling Act provided for the exchange of information between state and
federal enforcement agencies as well as the disclosure of information for
any purpose permitted under state law.15 This, coupled with the publicity
surrounding sex offenders and their crimes, has paved the way for the
continued revision of sexual offender statutes around the nation. Laws that
formerly took the form of simple registration requirements have become
increasingly complex, restricting employment opportunities,16 broadening
the definition of crimes within the statute, and placing restrictions on where
offenders may live upon release.17 In 2006, Congress proposed changes to
the Sexual Offender Registration Act and those changes were signed into
law by President George W. Bush on July 27, 2006 as the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006.18
The Walsh Act defines and requires a three-tier classification system for
offenders, much like the New Jersey statute.19 In developing this system,
the Walsh Act also increases the minimum registration requirements from
ten years to fifteen years for Tier One offenders.2 0 Based on this new
federal mandate, states will again have to revise their statutes in order to
become compliant.
With these increased restrictions come questions about their
constitutionality. The vast majority of the constitutional challenges have
failed completely, yet they continue to be filed. The public interest in
12 Megan's Law, 64 Fed. Reg. 572 (Jan. 5, 1999).
13 Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, http://www.megannicolekankafoundation.org (last
visited Mar. 26, 2007).
14 Id.
15 Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 11o Stat. 1345 (1996).
i6 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.380 (2oo6).
17 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 17.545 (2OO6); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2OO6); Ox-o REV. CODE
ANN. § 2950.031 (2OO6); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2oo6).
18 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (2oo6).
19 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § i i i. Seealso N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-I 2
(2O06) and infra notes 8o-89 and accompanying text.
2o Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § H 5.
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this type of legislation and preventing tragedies like that involving Megan
Kanka is great. Therefore, the importance of analyzing the issues that arise
when trying to balance the interest of the public with the interest of these
offenders is obvious and the consequences on both sides of the issue can
be tremendous.
With that in mind, the Introduction of this Note will undertake just such
an analysis to look at striking that balance. Part I of this Note will examine
the recently amended Kentucky Sexual Offender Registration Act and
compare it to similar laws in other states, with particular emphasis on those
states that also incorporate residency restrictions. Part II will look at the
lawsuit filed in Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
challenging the amended Kentucky statute. It will also address previously
failed constitutional challenges to other sex offender registration statutes.
Finally, the Conclusion will look very closely at the Kentucky challenge
and suggest, based upon constitutional analyses, why this case and others
like it should prevail. In so doing, it will also address some of the recent
victories claimed in Kentucky trial courts.
I. SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS
A. The Kentucky Sexual Offender Registration Act
As mandated by the Federal Acts, Kentucky passed a law requiring certain
sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement officers upon their
release from imprisonment."1 As with most other states, the law required
that offenders must include their name, local address, fingerprint, and
photograph with the information to be updated at least every two years.2 2
It provided that the minimum registration period was ten years, as required
by the Jacob Wetterling Act. 3 In short, the law met the minimum standards
required by the federal act. 4 However, like other states, the legislature
in Kentucky has continued to feel the pressure brought to bear by the
public's concern about the legitimate dangers that these offenders pose.
Certainly there are concerns about recidivism among these particular
offenders. There is also the concern that without legislation like this, these
offenders would go undetected and pose even more of a threat if they
were completely unmonitored. This continued concern coupled with the
media's coverage has resulted in exceedingly restrictive laws for convicted
sex offenders.
Kentucky is no different in this respect and very large changes were
made to the Sexual Offender Registration Act during the 2006 session of the
21 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510 (2006).
22 Id. at § 17.510(3)-(4).
23 Megan's Law, 64 Fed. Reg. 572 (Jan. 5, 1999).
24 Id.
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General Assembly with the passage of House Bill 3.15 The minimum period
of registration was increased from ten years to twenty years.26 Perhaps the
greatest change to the law is the residency restriction that bars convicted
sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a high school, middle school,
elementary school, preschool, publicly owned playground, or licensed day
care facility.2" The effects of this change are drastic, requiring registrants
to become compliant with the new law within ninety days of it going into
effect, whether they own or rent their property.28 In addition to the residency
requirements, it expands the category of sex offenders now subject to the
law from those on parole, probation or any type of judicial supervision, to
include those no longer under any type of judicial supervision.2 9
B. Similar Legislation in Other States
All fifty states now have some sexual offender registration law in place.
30
The general provisions follow closely with the mandate from the federal
acts, with certain registration information required, along with a photograph,
fingerprint, and other identifying information. The statutes provide the
term of years for registration (subject to the minimum federal standards)
as well as varying penalties for failure to register or update registration
information. The state law enforcement officials who will administer the
program are also designated within the statutes.
While this is the bare minimum allowed under the federal guidelines,
a number of other states have made changes similar to those made by
Kentucky. In fact, the Kentucky statute was modeled after the Iowa
law which prohibits sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of real
property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary school, secondary
school, or child care facility.31 Unlike the Kentucky statute, it does contain
an exception for those registrants required to serve a sentence at a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility located within the loci prohibitum.
32
The Iowa law also provides an exception for those who established their
residency prior to July 1, 2002 (the effective date of the statute) or where
25 Kentucky House of Representatives Sends House Bill 3 to Gov. Fletcher for Signature, U.S.
STATE NEWS, Mar. 24, 2006.
26 H.B. 3, § 7(3), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Session (Ky. 2006).
27 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(2) (2006).
28 Owen Covington, Law's Burden Falls on Sex Offenders: State tightening residency, supervi-
sion requirements, OWENSBORO MESSENGER-INQUIRER, (Owensboro, Ky.) July 10, 2006, at Ai.
29 Andrew Wolfson, Sex Offenders Fight Residence Rules, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL
Sept.. 21, 2oo6, at I B.
30 KlaasKids Foundation, http://www.meganslaw.org (tracking all the state legislation
passed in response to the federal requirements) (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
31 IOWA CODE § 69 2A.2A (2006).
32 Id.
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a school or childcare facility is newly located on or after July 1, 2002.33
Even with these exceptions, Iowa has faced great difficulty in maintaining
their registry given that many offenders cannot find a place to live and still
be compliant with this restrictive law.' Law enforcement officers there
suggest the law has done anything but make the state safer.35 The Chief
Deputy in the sheriff's office in Dubuque County, Iowa stated that thirty
of their offenders were forced to move because of the law and because of
the difficulty involved in compliance, those offenders are now giving false
addresses.36 While the measure was passed in order to keep closer ties on
the location of sex offenders, it has in fact had the completely opposite
effect, leaving officers with many offenders classified as "whereabouts
unconfirmed."37
The Mississippi statute provides that "a person required to register
[under the sex offender registration act] shall not reside within one
thousand five hundred (1,500) feet of the real property comprising a
public or nonpublic elementary school or secondary school or a child care
facility."3 But like Iowa, the Mississippi law provides an exception for
those registrants "serving a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or
other correctional institution or facility."3 9 It also provides an exemption
for those who "established the subject residence prior to July 1, 2006 [the
date the law went into effect] or [whe'e] the school or child care facility is
located within one thousand five hundred (1,500) feet of the school or child
care facility subsequent to the date the person established residency. '
The Ohio law prohibits sexual offenders from living within 1,000
feet of any school premises.4 1 It also provides a private cause of action
against any offender who establishes residency within this prohibited area
by other owners of property in the area as well as the local prosecutor.
41
Georgia's law, like that of Iowa, prohibits residency or loitering within 1,000
feet of a child-care facility or school, but adds churches "and or area[s]
where minors congregate" to the list of prohibited areas.43 It also prohibits
33 Id. at § 692A.zA(4)(a)-(c); Wolfson, supra note 29 (citing the complaint that challenges
the Kentucky statute).
34 Cassondra Kirby, Relocating Sex Criminals Can Backfire-In Iowa, Many Just Vanish
Kentucky's Law Begins in July, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 18, 2oo6, at Ai.
35 Id. (quoting Linn County, Iowa Sheriff, Don Zeller, who says only half of Iowa's sex
offenders are now accounted for, compared with 90% before the law went into effect).
36 Id. (quoting Dubuque County, Iowa Chief Deputy Don Vrotsos).
37 Id. (quoting Don Zeller).
38 Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)(a) (2007).
39 Id. at § 45-33-25(4)(b)(i).
40 Id. at § 4 5 - 33 -z 5 (4 )(b)(iii).
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29 5o.o34(A) (2007).
42 Id. at § 2950.034 (B).
43 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2007).
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offenders from being employed by a facility that is within 1,000 feet of the
prohibited areas.' Like the Kentucky statute, the Georgia statute measures
the distance of 1,000 feet from outer property line to outer property line,
not from the walls of the structures.4 This is particularly problematic in
Kentucky where offenders who were compliant under the former standard
(with 1,000 feet being measured from the outside wall of their home to
the outside wall of the school, daycare, etc.) are now being forced to move
because their property lines are too near the prohibited structures. Unlike
the Ohio law, the Georgia statute expressly prohibits a private right of action
against offenders who establish residency in violation of the provision.
46
Alabama goes one step further limiting an offenders' residence not only
as it relates to schools and child-care facilities, but also as it relates to the
victim. 47 Offenders are prohibited from living within 2,000 feet of a school or
child care facility and within 1,000 feet of the property on which any of the
former victims or the victims' immediate family members reside.48 While
it does provide an exception for those situations where changes to property
within 2,000 feet of the offenders established residency would mean non-
compliance, the law continues to limit the employment opportunities for
these offenders by prohibiting employment in facilities within 500 feet of a
school, child-care facility, playground, park, athletic facility or field, or any
other business or facility having a principal purpose of caring for, educating
or entertaining minors.
49
The results have been much the same in all of these states, with
offenders having considerable trouble locating any area that is acceptable
under the new law.5" The practical challenges of living under the new law
have provoked scrutiny from many groups that has led to a number of new
challenges to these laws.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Challenging the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act
After the adoption of the amendments to the Sex Offender Registration
Act provided by House Bill 3, but prior to its enforcement, a lawsuit
was filed in Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
challenging the new law, particularly the residency restrictions placed upon
44 Kirby, supra note 34.
45 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (a) (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (1) (2007).
46 GA. CODEANN. § 42-1-15(e).
47 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(b) (2007).
48 Id. at § 15-2o-26(a) & (b).
49 Id. at § 15-20-26(e) & (g).
5o Greg Bluestein, No Place for Sex Offenders to Go-Georgia Law Bars Them From Living
Virtually Anywhere, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 24, 2006, at A3.
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sex offenders."1 This provides a new challenge to the laws, given that prior
challenges had been based upon civil commitment statutes, registration
requirements and the community notification provisions of those statutes.s
While the specific provision of the law being challenged is different, the
constitutional basis for the challenges remains the same. The plaintiffs
have asserted violations of the ex post facto clause, procedural due process,
substantive due process, the right against self-incrimination, the takings
clause, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 3
The assertions contained in this complaint are based upon a class of
nine plaintiffs, all of whom are previously convicted sex offenders who
will be forced to relocate because of the residency restrictions placed
upon offenders by the amendments to the Sex Offender Registration Act
in House Bill 3.54 Their stories, summarized in the complaint, include an
elderly man, forced from his nursing home.5 Particularly troubling about
his plight is the fact that his son lives near the Lexington nursing home
in which he currently resides and is able to assist in his care. When he is
forced to move, he will be hours away from his family as well as his current
medical providers. His current doctors fear that such a dramatic change in
his surroundings could negatively affect his physical and mental health.56
Another plaintiff suffering under the restrictions of the revised law is
a single mother who must either break her lease and remove her children
from their schools or face criminal prosecution. 7 She pleaded guilty to
statutory rape more than ten years ago and has since completed treatment
for her offense as well as the domestic violence she was enduring at that
time. This woman specifically obtained permission from her probation
officer to occupy her current residence and intended to purchase the home
at the end of her lease.58 Because the Kentucky law makes no provision for
"grandfathering" in offenders who currently live in compliance, her plans
have changed. She and her two children will be looking for a new home,
breaking their current lease and possibly moving away from their schools.
An elderly man who must sell the home he and his wife have occupied
for thirty-nine years is also among those being forced to move because of
51 Complaint, Doe v. Fletcher, No. 3:o6-CV-47 4-S (W.D. Ky. Sept. 20, 2006); Suit
Challenges Sex Offender Law-Says Residence Limitations Are Too Strict, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Sept. 22, 2006, at C3 .
52 Infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
53 First Amended Complaint at 14, Doe v. Fletcher, No. 3:o6-CV-474-S (W.D. Ky. Oct.
5, 2oo6).
54 Suit Challenges Sex Offender Law, supra note 51.
55 First Amended Complaint, supra note 53, at 4-5.
56 Id. at 4-5.
57 Id. at 3-4.
58 Id. at 4.
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the heightened restrictions. 9 This move is particularly burdensome for
him not only because he must abandon his home of nearly forty years, but
because he is retired and lives on a fixed income after retiring from the
job he held for thirty-four years.6" The judge who sentenced him entered
an order that he could continue to live at his current address, but the new
law imposes additional criminal liability on him if he chooses to do that.61
As mentioned above, the Kentucky statute makes no allowances even for
those with judicial permission to occupy their current residences. The
complaint includes many others just like them and there are certainly
many more citizens of the Commonwealth who face similar obstacles to
comply with the new statute. One particular plaintiff must register for an
additional ten years because of the amended law.6" All of these plaintiffs
lived in compliance with the former law and now must make changes to
their lives because of the recently enacted statute.
The stark reality for these plaintiffs is that if Kentucky had adopted a
grandfather clause for those offenders already registered and in compliance
with the law, they would not have to move. As mentioned previously,
Iowa and Mississippi expressly exclude those offenders who had already
established residency prior to the enactment of the law.63 Note also that the
Kentucky statute is burdensome not only for offenders but for corrections
officials who must move those offenders who are currently incarcerated in
facilities that are within 1,000 feet of the prohibited areas.
A motion for preliminary injunction to prevent these and other people
like them from being evicted from their homes was filed but denied on
October 10, 2006. 64 The motion asserted that the intent and effect of
House Bill 3 was to punish the plaintiffs in violation of the Ex Post Fact
Clause of the United States Constitution. 65 In support of this assertion, the
memorandum pointed to legislative intent, evidenced by the title of the bill
and a survey of other cases in which an "affirmative disability or restraint"
was placed upon offenders. 66 Along those lines, the lack of a grandfather
clause for offenders living in compliance prior to this law was cited as well
as a comparison to other states that allow offenders to retain their residence
if a new facility is opened after their moving there.
67
59 Id. at 7.
60 Id.
6I Id.
62 Id.
63 See IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2oo6).
64 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Doe v. Fletcher, Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-474-S,
2oo6 WL 449566o, (W.D. Ky. Oct. To, zoo6).
65 Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Doe v. Fletcher, Civil Action No. 3:o6-CV- 4 7 4 -S (W.D. Ky. Oct. 1o, 2006).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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In denying the motion, Chief Judge Heyburn simply found that the
factors to be considered when granting a preliminary injunction were not
satisfied. The factors to be considered are: (1) whether the movant has a
"strong" likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would
otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the
public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.68
He cited what he thought were gross inadequacies for the first two prongs
that could not be overcome by the last two.69 The leniency of other courts
in allowing the rights of sex offenders to be restricted was also offered as
support for his failure to presume that this law might be unconstitutional. 0
He also cited the discretion bestowed upon law enforcement officers not to
evict offenders immediately upon the date of enforcement.7 The reality of
this seemed questionable even then, given Fayette County Sheriff Kathy
Witt's statements that at 12:01am, deputies would be knocking on doors to
begin arresting those in violation.7" Law enforcement authorities in other
places, such as Louisville and Winchester were more forgiving, issuing
citations to those in violation.73
Heyburn did offer suggestions where the case for the plaintiffs might
be improved. He pointed out that their strongest argument, that the
statute operates as an ex post facto punitive law against persons who had
previously been living lawfully in an area but will be forced to move, might
be strengthened by showing that plaintiffs will be unable to find other
residency or unable to recuperate fair value for their properties.74 With
the date of enforcement now passed, this proof could be very soon coming.
While this order did not result in an immediate victory for these plaintiffs
and others like them, the battle continues to wage on.
B. Challenges in Other States
1. Kansas v. Hendricks.75 -The Supreme Court of the United States has
not taken many opportunities to address the issues raised with the passage
68 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 64 (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 E3d
729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)).
69 Id. at 2.
70 Id. at 1-2.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Cassondra Kirby, Fayette Sex Offenders Told They Have to Move-Buffers Set Around
Schools, Playgrounds, Day Cares-Downtown Lexington Virtually off Limits, with a Few Exceptions,
LEXINGTON HERALD--LEADER, June IO, 2oo6, at Ai.
73 Shawntaye Hopkins, Little Room for Sex Offenders-New Restrictions Limit Where They
Can Live in Fayette, Lead to Clusters, LEXINGTON HERALD--LEADER, Dec. I I, zoo6, at Ai.
74 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 64.
75 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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of these statutes and the subsequent constitutional challenges. It did,
however, take the opportunity to implicitly affirm a constitutional basis for
them in Kansas v. Hendricks.76 The Court found that the liberty interest
asserted by those subject to the civil commitment statute employed in
Kansas was not absolute.77 The Court stated "the liberty secured by the
Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction
does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in
all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. '78 This was reiterated when
the Court examined other cases in which involuntary civil commitment
statutes were consistently upheld as long as the confinement was not carried
out without proper procedures and evidentiary standards.79 Kansas' statute
was not deficient in providing these proper procedures and evidentiary
standards because a finding of future dangerousness and an inability to
control that dangerousness was a prerequisite to confinement under the
law.8° The majority found this to be in line with their previous decisions.8 1
In addition to asserting that his due process rights were violated by this
restriction on his liberty, Hendricks asserted an ex post facto violation." The
Court was just as unwilling to accept this argument, finding that Kansas had
not established criminal proceedings that would punish him beyond the
prison sentence he had already served.83 In particular, the Court looked to
statutory construction as a guide for determining whether civil or criminal
proceedings had been instituted against a defendant.84 Kansas placed
this law within its probate code, instead of its criminal code; this evidence
supported the Court's finding that the intent of the legislature was not to
institute criminal proceedings against these defendants. 5 In these cases,
the Court will defer to the legislature's intent except in those cases where
the party challenging the law provides "the clearest proof' that the scheme
is so punitive in purpose or effect that it is obviously not civil in nature.
86
While that case dealt exclusively with the civil commitment statute in
Kansas, the Court has declined to hear two other cases involving challenges
76 Hope E. Durant, Note, A Message to Sex Offenders: Sex Registration and Notification Laws
Do Not Infringe Upon Your Pursuit of Happiness, 26 J. LEGIS. 293-294 (2000).
77 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,356 (1997).
78 Id. at 356-357 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
79 Id. at 357.
80 Id. at 357-358.
81 Id. at 358.
82 Id. at 361.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (198o)).
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to sex offender registration laws, suggesting that the result would be the
same when dealing with similar issues that arise in these cases.8 7
2. Doe v. Poritz.8 8 -While New Jersey was not the first state to pass a
Sexual Offender Registration law, it was certainly the most publicized
given that it was a direct response to the gruesome incident involving
young Megan Kanka. s9 It was not long after the passage of the law that
the first constitutional challenges were mounted. The New Jersey statute
met the minimum federal guidelines, requiring registration of fingerprints,
a photograph as well as name, address and nature of the offense.' With
regard to the publication of information, New Jersey developed a tier
system." If risk of re-offense is low, only those law enforcement agencies
likely to encounter the person registered are notified.92 If the risk is
moderate, organizations in the community are notified subject to the
Attorney General's guidelines.93 Finally, if risk of re-offense is high, the
public is notified subject to the Attorney General's guidelines that aim to
alert those members of the public likely to encounter the person.94 This
system required the Attorney General to develop factors which would
correspond to the likelihood of re-offending and base public notification
upon the level the offender is placed in. 95 In Doe v. Poritz, the plaintiff not
only challenged the law on substantive due process grounds but strove to
challenge the law as applied to him.96 The New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the laws, denying all the substantive claims,
but did find that the tier system required something more to satisfy the
constitutional requirements.97
Upholding the laws, the Court found that registration and community
notification requirements were "rationally related to [the] legitimate state
interest," of protecting the public from a group of offenders particularly
likely to re-offend.98 The Court further held that the Constitution does
not prevent society from attempting to protect itself from these offenders
87 Durant, supra note 76, at 293-94.
88 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (1995).
89 See generally Marc Klaas, Introduction: Afegan's Law by State, http://www.meganslaw.org
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § zC:7-4 (2007).
91 Id. at § 2C:7-8.
92 Id. at § 2C:7-8(c)(1).
93 Id. at § 2C:7-8(C)(2).
94 Id. at § 2C:7-8 (c) (3).
95 Id. at § 2C:7-8.
96 Prettyman, supra note 6 at 1092.
97 Id.
98 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.zd 367,414 (995).
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despite the inevitable punitive impact on these people.' This finding is
in line with the majority of Courts who have dealt with this issue.0 0 The
New Jersey Supreme Court examined fully the legislature's challenge in
addressing these issues of safety while attempting to balance the interests
of those convicted and like the Supreme Court in Hendricks, found that the
legislative intent was not punitive but rationally related to that legitimate
state interest. 1°'
The New Jersey law challenged in Hendricks had not only a registration
component but also a community notification component. The plaintiff
challenged the notification portion as violating his due process rights despite
the legislature's attempt to adequately provide protections by developing a
"tier system" that dictated the level of community notification. In requiring
more of the Attorney General with regard to the tier system, the Court found
that a certain liberty interest was implicated by the disclosure of personal
information and the potential harm to reputation, enough to trigger both
the due process and fairness doctrines in the state of New Jersey.'0 Under
the law, all offenders were subject to some level of community notification,
but those offenders with a moderate to high risk of re-offense faced more
widespread community notification and consequently, greater implication
of their due process rights.103 In finding that the procedures in place failed
to ensure the preservation of the defendant's due process rights, the Court
required that those offenders who were found to be within the second or
third tier (those subject to wider public notification) were entitled to a
hearing before such categorization could be placed upon them.' °4 Further,
the Court held that judicial review through a summary proceeding must be
allowed prior to notification if sought by any person under the law.105
a. Other Substantive Challenges to Sex Offender Registration Laws-To
hypothesize about the future probability of successful constitutional
challenges, it is necessary to look at why the Hendricks challenge failed
on substantive grounds. Doe, in Poritz, challenged the law as a violation
of the prohibition of ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, double jeopardy,
cruel and unusual punishment, invasion of privacy, as well as a deprivation
of due process and equal protection rights under the United States and
New Jersey Constitutions. 10 6 His ex post facto claim was based upon the
retroactive effect that these laws have, imposing additional requirements
99 Id. at 372.
ioo See infra notes ioo-i 16 and accompanying text.
ioi Poritz, 662 A.2d at 373,377.
i02 Poritz, 662 A.2d at 382.
103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (2007).
104 Poritz, 66z A.2d at 382.
1o5 Id. at 382.
io6 Prettyman, supra note 6, at i o92.
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upon defendants who have already committed their crimes. 10 The claim
of invasion of privacy was based upon the requirement that offenders be
fingerprinted, photographed and have other documents maintained as
part of the public record. 108 Further, he brought claims under the Due
Process Clause based on the lack of procedure in place for offenders to
challenge their classification under the law."9 The majority of other
constitutional challenges have followed from this framework. However,
the result has generally been the same. Courts have repeatedly upheld the
constitutionality of these laws.
One issue that is crucial to this determination is whether these laws are
regulatory in nature or are in fact some attempt at further punitive effects
on offenders. One glaring finding in this case was that the legislature
had taken great pains to establish the purpose of the law as remedial and
regulatory.110 To determine what would constitute punitive intent, the
Court undertook an analysis, looking at the test provided in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez"' and how that test was subsequently interpreted in a
number of cases. According to the Court in Kennedy, the factors relevant for
determining whether an act is penal or regulatory in character include:
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.'
Following this survey of the law, the Court found that a statute that can
fairly be characterized as remedial, both in its purpose and implementing
provisions, does not constitute punishment even though it may have
some inevitable deterrent impact and adversely affect those subject to
its provisions. " 3 The New Jersey law was found to meet the requisite
definition of remedial, with the deterrent effects not so great as to overcome
the legislative intent of protecting the public."4
107 Poritz, 662 A.2d at 387-405.
io8 Id. at 4o6-13.
io9 Id. at 381-82.
110 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-I (2007).
iii Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
112 Id. at 168-169.
113 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,388 (1995).
114 Id. at 404.
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More recent challenges include the challenge by another anonymous
plaintiff to the Alaska sex offender registration statute.115 In this suit,
the challenge was again based upon the ex post facto prohibition in the
United States and Alaskan Constitution. Smith v. Doe was the first time the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to a plaintiff challenging a
registration law as a violation of the ex post facto clause. Like the Kansas
and New Jersey cases, the Court's determination turned upon whether
the state had instituted a criminal or civil proceeding. 1 6  The Court
revisited the analysis from Kansas v. Hendricks, looking first to the statutory
construction and affording the legislature considerable deference." 7 The
Court also cited the legitimate non-punitive governmental objective of
protecting the public by imposing restrictive measures on sex offenders
that the Alaska legislature expressed in the statutory text; the legislature
cited the high risk of re-offending that sex offenders pose and the "primary
governmental" interest of the law in protecting the public from sex
offenders. " 8 In upholding the law, the Court found that the "registration
requirements make a valid regulatory program effective do not impose
punitive restraints in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause." '119
A companion case to Smith v. Doe was Connecticut Department of Public
Safety v. Doe,12 0 which challenged provisions of Connecticut's sex offender
registry law. At issue in that case were the public notification provisions
of the Connecticut statute that permitted the name, address, photograph
and descriptions of offenders to be made available on the internet.' The
plaintiff in this case made a due process argument that being'subjected
to these registration requirements modified his legal status and damaged
his reputation without providing notice or the opportunity to contest.2 2
The plaintiff was successful in the lower courts, with the Second Circuit
finding that the law did violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 3  His argument was based in large part on the failure to
distinguish between violent and non-violent offenders in their classification
scheme124 and the subsequent stigma thrust upon him by his mere inclusion
115 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (challenging ALAsKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (2007)).
1I6 Id. at 92 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)).
117 Id.
1i8 Id. at93.
II9 Id. at 102.
120 Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
121 Id. at 4.
I 22 Jennifer G. Daugherty, Note, Sex Offender Registration Laws andProceduralDue Process:
Why Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex. Rel. Lee Should be Overturned, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 713,
719 (2003).
123 Id. at 723.
124 Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 E3 d 38, 44 (2001).
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in the publication.' However, the United States Supreme Court was not
so inclined. The Court did not find that the issue of currently dangerous
offenders was relevant, given that Connecticut had chosen to include
offenders based on their previous conviction and not on the threat of their
re-offending.1 6 Due process does not require the opportunity to prove a
fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. Thus, in this case,
the defendants were not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing on whether
they are likely to re-offend because their conviction alone placed them
under the auspices of the statute, not their future dangerousness.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Constitutional Analysis
Based upon the predominant failure of constitutional challenges to sex
offender registration laws, success does not appear to be in the near future.
However, by applying thorough constitutional analysis to the challenge to
the Kentucky statute, the invalidation of these residency restrictions looks
more promising.
The first step in analyzing the plaintiffs' claims is to look at the
requirements of asserting a procedural due process claim. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no state
shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."'2 7 In the past, challenges to these statutes have been based upon
a liberty interest, a claim that is always harder to mount because of the
stringent standard imposed by the Court on plaintiffs asserting such a claim.
The claim challenging residency restrictions is clearly based on a property
interest. Of course, the Supreme Court has held that property interests
are not created by the Constitution, but are defined "by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source."' 8 In most cases,
this independent source is state law. The Kentucky Constitution proclaims
that the right of acquiring and protecting property is within those rights
inherent in all men.1
2 9
Having established the source of this property interest, the next step
in the analysis is determining whether the government provides adequate
process before it deprives the citizen of that interest.3 ' In the case of
the Kentucky statute, there is absolutely no process in place that would
allow offenders who are being deprived of their property to appeal or
125 Daugherty, supra note 122, at 719.
126 Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. i at 4.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
128 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
129 Ki. CONST. § I.
13o Roth, 408 U.S. 569-70.
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be heard on the matter. This is at odds with other states who allow the
grandfathering of those offenders who had already established residency
prior to the passage of these laws. This is also at odds with the laws of
a Commonwealth that values so much the ability to acquire and protect
property that it constitutionally requires it.
In determining what process is due a citizen in this situation, the Court
has provided a flexible balancing test that allows the weighing of the private
interest in preserving the status quo against the government interest in
summary adjudication."' The ultimate due process question in these cases
is whether it is appropriate to sacrifice the very real interests of citizens in
continuing to live in their own homes on the altar of public safety. The
factors to be considered when addressing this question are:
the private interest that will be affected by the official action, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.13
The private interest at issue here is obvious. Each of these citizens has a
very real interest in continuing to live in their established homes. Some of
them have actual ownership interests in these homes.
The risk of erroneous deprivation here is unlike that considered in other
cases. Generally, this factor concerns whether welfare recipients would be
unfairly deprived of benefits to which they are actually entitled. Certainly
these citizens are entitled to occupy their own homes. To deprive them
of this without some hearing would be erroneous on its face. Finally, the
government interest in these cases has been repeatedly recognized. These
statutes are cited as a protective measure, aimed at keeping our children
and families safe. This Note proposes that this Commonwealth should
not force such deprivation upon citizens having already served time for
their offenses and who wish to move on with their lives. Instead of having
consistency and stability, these citizens will be uprooted every time a
prohibited facility goes up near their residence. Herein lies the problem.
Not only is this particular statute a violation of the procedural due
process guaranteed by the Constitution, this law may be one of the
first to fail the ex post facto challenge. Chief Judge Heyburn actually
referenced this as the strongest argument this group of plaintiffs asserted
in their complaint.'33 As discussed previously, this challenge always turns
131 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334 (1976).
132 Id. at 335.
133 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 64.
2007-2008]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
on whether the regulation is civil or criminal in nature, whether it has
additional punitive effect for those offenders who have been previously
convicted of their crimes and have served any sentence in connection with
that conviction. The Constitution expressly prohibits the passage of ex post
facto laws. 34 These were first defined by the Court as a law which inflicts
punishment for any act which was not a crime at the time of commission or
one which increases the "degree of punishment previously denounced for
any specific offense."'35
The pertinent part of that definition for these cases is increasing the
degree of punishment previously denounced for any specific offense.
The most obvious illustration of an increased punishment would be if a
defendant committed a crime that had a punishment of five years when it
was committed, but was subsequently given a ten year sentence. However,
that is not the only way that the degree of punishment could be increased.
The way in which these citizens have been subjected to an increased
punishment is more subtle but no less deplorable. What formerly resulted in
a fixed registration period and certain additional restrictions has now brought
upon them increased registration periods and residency requirements that
force many from their homes. As alleged in the complaint, some of these
offenders were not subject to any residency restrictions prior to the passage
of House Bill 3136 For others, the law extended the period of registration. i37
As obvious as it may seem that these people are now faced with a greater
punishment than was in effect when they were convicted of their crimes,
the issue is still up for debate.
B. The Legislative Realily
The debate generally leads to the validation of these laws because the
legislatures have made clear their intention to steer clear of punishment
and instead implement these laws as a regulatory and public safety measure.
Using traditional punishment analysis as the Supreme Court has handed
it down brings about the same result. The analysis traditionally used is
illustrated in the earlier cited, Kansas v. Hendricks case which finds that these
acts do not establish further criminal proceedings against the offenders.
138
The result in Smith v. Doe was the same as the Court held that failing to
require individual determinations of dangerousness did not result in an ex
post facto violation 39 However, applying the tests used in any of these
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
135 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (I798) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
136 First Amended Complaint, supra note 53, at 6.
137 Id. at 7.
138 Kansas v. Hendricks, 52I U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
139 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003).
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cases could produce a different outcome. The initial inquiry is whether the
legislative intent was to enact a regulatory or punitive scheme. 4
For the Kentucky statute, legislative intent is evidenced in the first
line of House Bill 3, where it states, "[an ACT relating to sex offenses and
the punishment thereof."' 14' There may not be any stronger evidence than
this that the intent of the legislature was to punish sex offenders for their
crimes through the provisions of this bill. The case law suggests that if the
intent is determined to be punitive, that is the end of the inquiry.14 Yet
even faced with this obvious intention by the Kentucky General Assembly
to punish those who have already served for their crime, the Courts have
been slow to act as hundreds of Kentuckians are forced from their homes
While the outcome of the federal suit remains to be played out in the
courtrooms of the Commonwealth and perhaps, beyond, careful analysis
suggests that the residency restrictions being imposed upon previously
convicted offenders may be beyond the reach of the legislature. The case
for these offenders having been made repeatedly, they have finally met
some success in the trial courts of several Kentucky counties. Previously
convicted sex offenders in Clark, Kenton and Jefferson counties have
mounted successful constitutional challenges to the residency restrictions
as applied to them.'43 Each of the defendants were convicted of their
crimes before the passage of House Bill 3 and were subsequently charged
with violating its residency restrictions. In addition to asserting many of
the due process claims mentioned previously, these defendants asserted
additional violations based on alternate theories of banishment,1" the right
of interstate and intrastate travel,145as well as protections against unfair
classifications by the legislature.'"
While the rationale among the judges varied somewhat, the result is the
same. 147 Each of these defendants will escape the restrictions issued by the
14o Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 390 (1995).
14I H.B. 3, 2oo6 Gen. Ass., Reg. Session (Ky. 2006).
142 Poritz, 662 A.2d at 390.
143 Opinion of the Court and Order, Commonwealth v. Dykes, et al., o7-M-oo078, (Clark
Dist. Ct. Ky. July 24, 2007); Opinion of the Court and Order, Commonwealth v. Baker, et al.,
07-M-oo6o4, (Kenton Dist. Ct. Ky. Apr. 20, 2007); Jason Riley, Three Sex Offenders' Charges
Dismissed: Judge Says Residency Law Unconstitutional, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, July 25,
2007, at IA.
I44 Opinion of the Court and Order at 20, Commonwealth v. Baker, et al., o7-M-oo6o4,
(Kenton Dist. Ct. Ky. Apr. 20, 2007). Judge Martin J. Sheehan concludes that the residency
restrictions in place in Kentucky do, in fact, constitute a form of banishment, a punishment
that is "historically and traditionally punitive." Id.
145 Motion to Dismiss at 1 I, Commonwealth v. Jones, o6-M--o6814, (Kenton Dist. Ct.
Ky. Jan. 17, 2007).
146 Motion to Dismiss at 1o, Commonwealth v. Havens, o7-M-ooo79, (Clark Dist. Ct.
Ky. Mar. 20, 2007).
147 Judge Sheehan in Kenton County issued an in-depth, thirty-six page opinion that
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Kentucky legislature. Whether their individualized success will translate
into more widespread success for other Kentuckians is to be seen, given the
reluctance on the part of prosecutors to appeal such decisions. 48 Certainly
the hope is that their success will provide incentive for future defendants
(and undoubtedly there will be more) to challenge their new charges under
the law and eventually lead to movement with the federal case.
addressed the history, past analysis and statistical reasoning associated with sexual offenders
generally as well as residency restrictions applied to them. Hopefully, his treatment of the
issue will provide resources for other judges and attorneys to successfully mount future chal-
lenges.
148 It is the opinion of this author that this reluctance to appeal reflects acknowledge-
ment of the merits of the defendants, given that further loss on appeal would possibly widen
the scope of defendants to which the ruling applies. Riley, supra note 143, at IA (where the
Jefferson County Attorney expressed that they "might appeal").
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